HEAD-TO-HEAD · FACTS ONLY
Bay vs Pluto: AI endpoint control facts side by side
Short answer
Bay describes 1 of the four product control types on the pages we read and Pluto describes 0; they differ on on-device control. On decisions, Bay decides on a tool call before it runs and Pluto describes some control over tool calls. We do not score either; the right choice depends on the AI tools people use, your devices, your current stack and whether you block or guide.
By The Device Desk · Endpoint AI Finder · Published 2026-10-11
Desk research from public vendor pages read on 27 September and 11 October 2026. Profiles follow our published method; we did not run the products.
Vendor pages read September and October 2026 · updated 2026-10-13
Where do their controls sit?
- Filled or hatched marker: Bay
- Dashed teal ring: Pluto, described
- DEV Filled marker: described on the product pages we read
- DEV Hatched marker: partly described (another component, a narrower scope, or method not detailed)
- DEV Dashed marker: not in our sources (it may exist; we did not find it)
What are the facts, side by side?
| Fact | Bay | Pluto |
|---|---|---|
| Owner | None | None |
| Positioning | An endpoint-first control layer for AI agents, coding assistants and MCP servers on employee devices. Bay describes itself as a fully preventive, agentless platform that classifies, governs and prevents risks across every AI agent and tool on enterprise endpoints. | "The first workspace security platform for the AI era": visibility, risk understanding and real-time guardrails for AI builders, developer tools and business workspaces. Founding team from Unit 8200, Microsoft and Palo Alto Networks; part of AWS, CrowdStrike and NVIDIA accelerators. Publishes research on Claude Code hooks, exposed MCP servers and Open VSX malware. |
| How it reaches devices | Deploys through your existing EDR or MDM, with no new agents and no new tools; Bay says it scans in minutes and exits cleanly. Source: Bay homepage · Read 27 Sep 2026 | (secondary: SACR) Agentless, through API integrations and existing CrowdStrike, Defender and MDM infrastructure. Pluto's own site has no product or documentation page describing rollout. Source: SACR (secondary): CISO guide to endpoint control and prevention, July 2026 · Read 13 Oct 2026 · secondary source |
| On-device controlDiffers | DescribedInventories AI agents, MCP servers, tools, credentials and extensions on the device, and its Enforcer returns Allow, Ask or Deny locally on prompts, pre-tool calls and post-tool responses on supported agent surfaces. Delivered as Wave, an ephemeral binary that runs through your existing MDM or EDR. Policies can be scoped by agent, group, endpoint or device. Source: Bay blog: Ghostjacking (re-read) · Read 11 Oct 2026 | Partly described(secondary: SACR) inline hook configuration on coding agents for runtime observability and enforcement. Source: SACR (secondary): CISO guide to endpoint control and prevention, July 2026 · Read 13 Oct 2026 · secondary source |
| Browser extension | Not in our sourcesNo browser extension is described. Bay's Application Control can allow or block browsers and extensions as applications, which is a device rule, not a control on what goes into browser AI. Source: Bay blog: Ghostjacking (re-read) · Read 11 Oct 2026 | Not in our sourcesNot described on the pages we read. |
| Network or SSE proxy | Not in our sourcesNot described on the pages we read. | Not in our sourcesNot described on the pages we read. |
| AI or MCP gateway | Not in our sourcesNot described on the pages we read. | Not in our sourcesNot described on the pages we read. |
| Names the coding agents it coversDiffers | MatchesManaged settings for Claude Code, Codex and Claude Desktop lock permission rules, preserve managed hooks, restrict MCP servers and constrain plugin sources. Source: Bay blog: Ghostjacking, an AI agent attack (August 2026) · Read 27 Sep 2026 | PartlyPluto's research covers Claude Code; SACR (secondary) says it governs tools such as ChatGPT, Claude and Copilot. Source: SACR (secondary): CISO guide to endpoint control and prevention, July 2026 · Read 13 Oct 2026 · secondary source |
| Decides on a tool call before it runsDiffers | MatchesEvaluates prompts, pre-tool calls and post-tool responses and returns Allow, Ask or Deny locally, which Bay states takes under 4ms with no cloud round-trip, on supported agent surfaces. Source: Bay blog: Ghostjacking (re-read) · Read 11 Oct 2026 | Partly(secondary: SACR) inline hooks on coding agents for runtime enforcement. Source: SACR (secondary): CISO guide to endpoint control and prevention, July 2026 · Read 13 Oct 2026 · secondary source |
| Controls what goes into browser AI | Not in our sources | Not in our sources |
| Rolls out through EDR or device management you runDiffers | MatchesDeploys through your existing EDR or MDM; no new agents. Source: Bay homepage · Read 27 Sep 2026 | Partly(secondary: SACR) deploys through existing CrowdStrike, Defender and MDM infrastructure. Source: SACR (secondary): CISO guide to endpoint control and prevention, July 2026 · Read 13 Oct 2026 · secondary source |
| Can warn or ask instead of only blockingDiffers | MatchesAsk is one of three answers, with Allow and Deny. Source: Bay homepage · Read 27 Sep 2026 | Not in our sources |
| Can block an agent, tool or actionDiffers | MatchesDeny stops an action. Rules cover MCP servers (an allow or block list, and per-tool rules for read, create, update, delete and execute), applications, CLIs, browsers, IDEs and extensions, credentials and files, network egress allow lists, and capability rules such as shell execution, package installation and cloud CLIs. Source: Bay blog: Ghostjacking (re-read) · Read 11 Oct 2026 | Not in our sources |
| Has a watch-only or simulation modeDiffers | MatchesSimulation Mode runs a rule without enforcing it. Source: Bay blog: Ghostjacking, an AI agent attack (August 2026) · Read 27 Sep 2026 | Not in our sources |
| Records who or what took each actionDiffers | MatchesRecords who triggered an action, whether a human was involved, and the chain from prompt to system action. Source: Bay homepage · Read 27 Sep 2026 | Not in our sources |
| Also covers SaaS, cloud or homegrown AI | Not in our sources | Not in our sources |
| Has a public price or tiers (vendor site or marketplace) | Not in our sources | Not in our sources |
| Built into | None | None |
| Works with | None in our sources | (secondary: SACR) deploys through existing CrowdStrike, Defender and MDM infrastructure. (secondary: SACR) deploys through existing CrowdStrike, Defender and MDM infrastructure. Source: SACR (secondary): CISO guide to endpoint control and prevention, July 2026 · Read 13 Oct 2026 · secondary source |
| Price | Not published. Bay's site has a demo request and no pricing page (re-checked 11 October 2026). Source: Bay homepage (re-read) · Read 11 Oct 2026 | Not published (demo request). Source: Pluto Security homepage · Read 13 Oct 2026 |
Where do they differ?
- On-device control: Bay describes it; Pluto partly describes it.
- Names the coding agents it covers: Bay matches; Pluto partly matches.
- Decides on a tool call before it runs: Bay matches; Pluto partly matches.
- Rolls out through EDR or device management you run: Bay matches; Pluto partly matches.
- Can warn or ask instead of only blocking: Bay matches; Pluto is not in our sources.
- Can block an agent, tool or action: Bay matches; Pluto is not in our sources.
- Has a watch-only or simulation mode: Bay matches; Pluto is not in our sources.
- Records who or what took each action: Bay matches; Pluto is not in our sources.
Choose Bay if
- Your developers run coding agents with many MCP servers and you want a decision on each action before it runs
- You want to add AI agent control through the EDR or MDM you already run instead of rolling out another agent
Choose Pluto if
- You want guardrails on coding agents without a new endpoint agent
Which limits should you check?
Bay
- Endpoint only: no browser extension, network proxy or AI gateway is described, and nothing on SaaS or cloud-hosted AI apps.
- One of the smallest public footprints here: a single homepage, two blog posts, no documentation portal and no published pricing (re-checked 11 October 2026).
- Headline figures such as under 5 minutes to deploy, under 1% false positives and 100% of shadow AI discovered are Bay's own statements and have not been verified.
Pluto
- Pluto publishes little product detail on its own site, so this profile relies partly on a third-party report.
- No price is published.