HEAD-TO-HEAD · FACTS ONLY
Ent vs Pluto: AI endpoint control facts side by side
Short answer
By The Device Desk · Endpoint AI Finder · Published 2026-10-11
Desk research from public vendor pages read on 27 September and 11 October 2026. Profiles follow our published method; we did not run the products.
Vendor pages read September and October 2026 · updated 2026-10-13
Where do their controls sit?
- Filled or hatched marker: Ent
- Dashed teal ring: Pluto, described
- DEV Filled marker: described on the product pages we read
- DEV Hatched marker: partly described (another component, a narrower scope, or method not detailed)
- DEV Dashed marker: not in our sources (it may exist; we did not find it)
What are the facts, side by side?
| Fact | Ent | Pluto |
|---|---|---|
| Owner | None | None |
| Positioning | An intent-aware AI endpoint: one programmable policy for people and AI agents, with interventions from a soft nudge to a hard block, an on-device small language model that classifies sensitive data, and investigation timelines written in plain language. Use cases: insider risk, last-mile threats such as ClickFix, AI usage control and data security. | "The first workspace security platform for the AI era": visibility, risk understanding and real-time guardrails for AI builders, developer tools and business workspaces. Founding team from Unit 8200, Microsoft and Palo Alto Networks; part of AWS, CrowdStrike and NVIDIA accelerators. Publishes research on Claude Code hooks, exposed MCP servers and Open VSX malware. |
| How it reaches devices | A single lightweight agent across Windows, macOS, Linux and modern browsers, run as SaaS or self-hosted in your own cloud; rollout through MDM is not stated. Source: Ent press: intent-aware prevention for AI agents, 30 July 2026 · Read 13 Oct 2026 | (secondary: SACR) Agentless, through API integrations and existing CrowdStrike, Defender and MDM infrastructure. Pluto's own site has no product or documentation page describing rollout. Source: SACR (secondary): CISO guide to endpoint control and prevention, July 2026 · Read 13 Oct 2026 · secondary source |
| On-device controlDiffers | DescribedA single lightweight agent across Windows, macOS and Linux with one programmable policy for people and AI agents. Source: Ent press: intent-aware prevention for AI agents, 30 July 2026 · Read 13 Oct 2026 | Partly described(secondary: SACR) inline hook configuration on coding agents for runtime observability and enforcement. Source: SACR (secondary): CISO guide to endpoint control and prevention, July 2026 · Read 13 Oct 2026 · secondary source |
| Browser extensionDiffers | DescribedBrowser-extension deployments generally available at launch. Source: Ent press: $100M seed, 16 June 2026 · Read 13 Oct 2026 | Not in our sourcesNot described on the pages we read. |
| Network or SSE proxy | Not in our sourcesNot described on the pages we read. | Not in our sourcesNot described on the pages we read. |
| AI or MCP gateway | Not in our sourcesNot described on the pages we read. | Not in our sourcesNot described on the pages we read. |
| Names the coding agents it coversDiffers | MatchesNames OpenAI Codex, Claude Code, Claude Cowork, GitHub Copilot and Cursor. Source: Ent press: intent-aware prevention for AI agents, 30 July 2026 · Read 13 Oct 2026 | PartlyPluto's research covers Claude Code; SACR (secondary) says it governs tools such as ChatGPT, Claude and Copilot. Source: SACR (secondary): CISO guide to endpoint control and prevention, July 2026 · Read 13 Oct 2026 · secondary source |
| Decides on a tool call before it runs | PartlyBlocks risky agent behavior where needed; per-tool-call mechanics are not described. Source: Ent press: intent-aware prevention for AI agents, 30 July 2026 · Read 13 Oct 2026 | Partly(secondary: SACR) inline hooks on coding agents for runtime enforcement. Source: SACR (secondary): CISO guide to endpoint control and prevention, July 2026 · Read 13 Oct 2026 · secondary source |
| Controls what goes into browser AIDiffers | PartlyClassifies sensitive data at the point of use on the device and in browsers; prompt-level controls are not detailed. Source: Ent press: intent-aware prevention for AI agents, 30 July 2026 · Read 13 Oct 2026 | Not in our sources |
| Rolls out through EDR or device management you runDiffers | Not in our sources | Partly(secondary: SACR) deploys through existing CrowdStrike, Defender and MDM infrastructure. Source: SACR (secondary): CISO guide to endpoint control and prevention, July 2026 · Read 13 Oct 2026 · secondary source |
| Can warn or ask instead of only blockingDiffers | MatchesInterventions range from a soft nudge to a hard block. Source: Ent homepage · Read 13 Oct 2026 | Not in our sources |
| Can block an agent, tool or actionDiffers | MatchesA hard block is one of its interventions. Source: Ent homepage · Read 13 Oct 2026 | Not in our sources |
| Has a watch-only or simulation mode | Not in our sources | Not in our sources |
| Records who or what took each actionDiffers | MatchesNatural-language investigation timelines. Source: Ent press: intent-aware prevention for AI agents, 30 July 2026 · Read 13 Oct 2026 | Not in our sources |
| Also covers SaaS, cloud or homegrown AI | Not in our sources | Not in our sources |
| Has a public price or tiers (vendor site or marketplace) | Not in our sources | Not in our sources |
| Built into | None | None |
| Works with | None in our sources | (secondary: SACR) deploys through existing CrowdStrike, Defender and MDM infrastructure. (secondary: SACR) deploys through existing CrowdStrike, Defender and MDM infrastructure. Source: SACR (secondary): CISO guide to endpoint control and prevention, July 2026 · Read 13 Oct 2026 · secondary source |
| Price | Not published (demo request). Source: Ent homepage · Read 13 Oct 2026 | Not published (demo request). Source: Pluto Security homepage · Read 13 Oct 2026 |
Where do they differ?
- On-device control: Ent describes it; Pluto partly describes it.
- Browser extension: Ent describes it; Pluto is not in our sources.
- Names the coding agents it covers: Ent matches; Pluto partly matches.
- Controls what goes into browser AI: Ent partly matches; Pluto is not in our sources.
- Rolls out through EDR or device management you run: Ent is not in our sources; Pluto partly matches.
- Can warn or ask instead of only blocking: Ent matches; Pluto is not in our sources.
- Can block an agent, tool or action: Ent matches; Pluto is not in our sources.
- Records who or what took each action: Ent matches; Pluto is not in our sources.
Choose Ent if
- You want one policy for people and AI agents, with nudges as well as blocks
- You need device and browser coverage from one agent
Choose Pluto if
- You want guardrails on coding agents without a new endpoint agent
Which limits should you check?
Ent
- Per-tool-call mechanics and rollout through MDM are not described on the pages we read.
- Uses its own agent, and no price is published.
Pluto
- Pluto publishes little product detail on its own site, so this profile relies partly on a third-party report.
- No price is published.